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Abstract
Drones have been a hot topic in recent years particularly when used in war and
in domestic police operations. Drones have also attracted attention because of high-
profile plans to use them for package delivery, among other things. While the
glamourous and future uses of drones catch media attention, drones are already
being used in the private sector for more mundane purposes including surveying,
infrastructure inspection and real estate sales promotion. While the privacy threats
of military and police drones are widely discussed, privacy concerns of private
drones have attracted much less consideration.
This paper looks at the privacy risks of private drones in Canada. It begins with
an overview of the uses of private drones and their regulation in Canada. Regulation
of drones in Canada is quite permissive and does not address the privacy risks. The
paper then presents several privacy theories and a deeper discussion of two problems
caused by technology such as drones: data aggregation and erosion of privacy in
public. The paper then considers some theoretical and practical legal protections
that might be used to protect against drone privacy invasion. The more theoretical
include the torts of trespass and nuisance. The more practical include the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion and the Personal Information and Electronic Documents
Act. The paper concludes that the dominant theories of privacy embedded in
Canadian law are not fully prepared for the challenge of drones, though the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion holds some promise for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Drones represent a significant development in robotic technology.1 They are
used routinely in war and increasingly in police operations. Drones are also used
in Canada today by private actors for many less dramatic applications.
Some drones are as big as small aircraft and will routinely fly in controlled
airspace while smaller drones will be found navigating cities at lower altitudes.
* BCL/LLB, McGill University. BSc, University of Victoria. Admitted to the New York
State Bar. The author would like to thank Ciara Bracken-Roche, Queens University,
Paul S. Dempsey, McGill Institute of Air & Space Law, Shayna Gersher, Carleton
University, and the blind reviewer, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Transport Canada refers to drones as Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) while the
International Civil Aviation Organization uses the terms Remotely-Piloted Aircraft
System (RPAS) and Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): Transport Canada, Staff
Instruction 623-001, ‘‘The review and processing of an application for a Special Flight
Operations Certificate for the Operation of an Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) System”
(27 November 2008) at 13, online: <www.tc.gc.ca> [SI2008].
Like other technology, drones are falling in price while becoming more
sophisticated. For several years, Transport Canada has been anticipating
increased private use of drones and has been developing regulations to
integrate them into Canadian airspace. Transport Canada’s regulation
development is motivated by the economic opportunity of drones as well as
the safety risks they present to other manned aircraft and people on the ground.
This paper focuses on the privacy impact of private drones. Like other
technology developments, drones reveal latent ambiguities in legal doctrines and
will influence development of the law. This paper is concerned with how the law
will respond to the privacy threat of drones and also how the latent ambiguities
in current privacy thinking will evolve in response to these challenges. In Canada,
privacy is protected through the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as well as
through private sector privacy legislation.
This paper has three sections. The first section will provide the context by
giving an overview of the history of private drones in Canada, their current
capabilities and uses, and Transport Canada’s plans for the future of drones.
While private drones are not uncommon, many people are not aware of their
current uses or how they may intrude on privacy. The second section will discuss
privacy theories and will show why privacy law must address data aggregation
and privacy in public. The third section will look at legal remedies to protect
against privacy violations by private drones. Since drones challenge current
privacy thinking, it is worth considering alternatives to privacy law itself. To this
end property law, in particular torts related to airspace rights, will be reviewed.
This section will focus on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and private sector
privacy legislation, reviewing the jurisprudence and providing a critical analysis
of the law’s capacity to deal with the privacy threats of drones.2
While state use of drones, particularly by police, raises concerns for privacy,
the impact of private drones on privacy has not been fully explored. This paper
does not take a position on the utility of drones or whether they should be
promoted, discouraged or heavily regulated. Like other technology, drones have
the potential for both positive and negative effects. One of the negative effects of
drones is a diminishing of privacy, which is the primary motive and subject of
this paper.
I. PRIVATE DRONES AND THEIR REGULATION
This section provides a detailed description of the private use of drones and
their regulation in Canada. This will show that commercial drone use is already
common, and that the regulation development process for them is already
advanced. Private drones are not a thing of the future. They are already in active
2 This paper considers federal legislation and privacy protection in common law
provinces. The Civil Code of Quebec and other legislation in Quebec provide a different
legal approach to privacy. Evaluating the capacity of Quebec’s approach to dealing with
the privacy threat of drones merits a separate paper.
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use in ways that some do not even realize are possible and Transport Canada is
laying the regulatory base to promote expansion of this nascent industry. While
privacy threats from above in the form of aircraft and helicopters are not new,
drones are different because they are more flexible and economical than aircraft.
The regulatory background provided here, along with the examples of current
private drone applications, will inform the privacy law analysis that follows.
(a) History of Drones and their Regulation
Private use of drones has been a hot media topic recently, but drones are not
new to Canada.3 One of the first private drone flights in Canada happened in
1998 off the coast of Tofino, British Columbia.4 This was the result of
collaboration between Environment Canada and Insitu, the latter wanting to
deploy drones for meteorological use. A few months later, Insitu completed the
first transatlantic drone flight, from Newfoundland to Scotland.5 This helped to
generate excitement for non-military drones in Canada though it was another
eight years before the Canadian government started serious work on drone
regulation.
Since 2006 Transport Canada has convened three different working groups
to address drone regulation. The first was the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Working Group (UAV-WG). That working group reported in 2007. Its report
proposed a number of amendments to the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR)
and developed a 5-year work plan for safe integration of drones into Canadian
airspace.6 The second working group was convened in 2008 to review the Special
Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC) process, which currently regulates private
drone operations.7 The working group recommended changes to the SFOC
process which were implemented that same year.8 The third and current working
group, called the UAV Systems Program Design Working Group (PDWG) was
convened in 2010.9 Its purpose is to implement the work plan created by the
original UAV-WG. It is expected to complete its work in 2017.10
3 See e.g. ‘‘HongKongprotest:Drone captures scale of protest”,BBCNews (30 September
2014), online: <www.bbc.com>; Alex Wilhelm, ‘‘Google Challenges Amazon for
Drone Supremacy”,TechCrunch (28 August 2014) online:<techcrunch.com>; Lauren
O’Neil, ‘‘Sexual harassment by drones a growing concern”, CBC News (11 June, 2014)
online: <www.cbc.ca>; ‘‘BP allowed commercial drones by US regulators in
unprecedented decision”, The Guardian (10 June 2014) online: <www.theguardian.-
com>.
4 Shayna Gersher, ‘‘Regulating Spies in the Skies: Recommendations for Drone Rules in
Canada”, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 33:3 (17 September 2014) 22 at 22.
5 Ibid.
6 Transport Canada Civil Aviation, Terms of Reference: UAV Systems Program Design
Working Group, (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2010) at 1 [TCCA].
7 Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, Canadian Aviation Regulations, S.O.R./96-433, ss.
602.41, 603.67 [CAR]; Gersher, supra note 4 at 23. A detailed description of the SFOC
process is provided below.
8 TCCA, supra note 6 at 1.
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The 2007 UAV-WG report stressed the economic importance of drones and
the hope that if Transport Canada developed regulations quickly, Canada could
become a world leader in drone technology.11 In 2012 Transport Canada issued
347 SFOCs and in 2013 that number increased to 945.12 With a SFOC, it is
possible for private individuals to operate just about any type of drone.
(b) Applications for Drones in the Private Sector
While the military and police applications for drones are well-known, the
scope of existing private sector applications are less well-known. Amazon has
received much publicity for its plan to deliver packages within 30 minutes via
drone, and the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has received an equal
amount of publicity for its reluctance to authorize the Amazon project.13
Amazon’s plans remain a future prospect, not only due to the regulatory
framework in the US, but also because Amazon still has a lot of testing to do
before its drones are ready to be put into widespread operation. While Amazon
and others have plans for the future, many businesses and individuals in Canada
are already using drones in commercial and personal operations. The Special
Flight Operations Certificate process, described later in the paper, already allows
for drones of any size with any payload to be approved for private use in
Canada.
Drones are being used to help navigate ice in the arctic. Fednav uses drones
equipped with cameras to survey the ice ahead of a ship to help the captain see
fractures in the ice.14 Drones are used in agriculture and in fact have been used
for this purpose in Japan since the 1970s.15 They can deliver pesticides and
fertilizers. The drone uses sensors that detect nitrogen levels to help the farmer
9 Canada,UAVSystems ProgramDesignWorkingGroup,Phase 1 Final Report (Ottawa:
Transport Canada, 2012) at 1 [Phase 1].
10 Charlotte Santry, ‘‘Droning on”, Canadian Lawyer (3 February 2014), online:
<www.canadianlawyermag.com>.
11 Ibid. Given that the policy review process started in 2006, and will continue until at least
2017, it appears that Transport Canada has not moved very quickly. However,
Transport Canada is well ahead of its American counterpart, something which has been
the subject of media attention in the United States.
12 Gersher, supra note 4 at 24-25.
13 See e.g. Charles Arthur, ‘‘Amazon seeks US permission to test Prime Air delivery
drones”, The Guardian (11 July 2014), online: <www.theguardian.com>. In March of
2015 media reported that Amazon had started doing outdoor tests in British Columbia,
because of the continued reluctance of the FAA to allow outdoor testing. In April of
2015, the FAA authorized Amazon to do outdoor testing at a company-owned site. See
Ed Pilkington, ‘‘Amazon tests delivery drones at secret Canada site after US
frustration”, The Guardian (30 March 2015), online: <www.theguardian.com>;
‘‘Commercial drones that fly beyond operator’s sight could be OKed in U.S.”, CBC
News (4 May 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
14 ‘‘Canadian shipping company uses drones to check ice conditions”,Vancouver 24 hrs (25
March 2014), online: <vancouver.24hrs.ca>.
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decide where to spread fertilizer. Using infrared sensors, a farmer can keep track
of the health of crops.16 Similarly, the US Geological Survey (USGS) is using a
previous generation of military drones for land-use planning and to monitor
wildlife. Using cameras the USGS can map roads and wetlands, and using
infrared cameras it can track the movements of wildlife at night.17 There are
some businesses in operation in Canada which provide ‘‘drones as a service”. The
services they offer include 3D mapping for surveys, aerial photography for real
estate agents, and infrastructure inspection.18 In general, drones are useful for
what Finn calls the three Ds: work that is dull, dangerous or dirty.19
While these examples are generally innocuous, like any technology, drones
also have more sinister applications. Drones used by stalkers and paparazzi are
examples that come to mind easily.20 At least one private security company in
Canada has considered using drones in its business, though it is not clear exactly
how.21 In addition to the cameras and sensors described already, drones can
carry heat & motion sensors, odour detectors and facial recognition cameras.22
Drones can be used to find and follow a particular individual.23 It is also worth
noting that any information collected by a private organization via drone may
eventually find its way into the hands of state authorities.24 Even drones not used
for surveillance collect large amounts of data about their surroundings as they
fly. The persistent observation that is possible using drones is more invasive than
casual observation and easily rises to the level of invasion of privacy. As the
director of NASA’s drone program for tracking hurricanes said: ‘‘If you drove
by a drug dealer’s house, you wouldn’t catch him; but if you stood there all day,
15 Mark Edward Peterson, ‘‘The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct
for Integration into theNationalAirspace System” (2006) 71 J.AirL.&Com. 521 at 546.
16 Omar elAkkad&KellyCryderman, ‘‘Canadian technologyand the flight of thedrones”,
The Globe and Mail (6 April 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>; Brian
Handwerk, ‘‘5 SurprisingDroneUses (BesidesAmazonDelivery)”,NationalGeographic
(2 December 2013), online: National Geographic <news.nationalgeographic.com>.
17 Handwerk, supra note 16.
18 See e.g. UAV Services, online: <www.uavservices.com>; High Eye Aerial Imaging,
online: <higheye.ca>.
19 See Rachel L. Finn & David Wright, ‘‘Unmanned aircraft systems: Surveillance, ethics
and privacy in civil applications” (2012) 28:2 Computer L. & Sec. Review 184.
20 See e.g. John Villasenor, ‘‘Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and
Privacy” (2013) 36:2 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 457 at 461.
21 See e.g. ‘‘Private security company poised to launch drones”, The Province (25 October
2013), online: <www.canada.com>.
22 Margot E. Kaminski, ‘‘Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry”
(2013) 4 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 57 at 57-59.
23 M.RyanCalo, ‘‘TheDrone as Privacy Catalyst” (2011) 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 29 at 30.
24 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 s. 7(3)
[PIPEDA].
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you might.”25 This is as applicable to the activities of ordinary people as it is to
the activities of drug dealers.
As suggested by these examples, drones come in many shapes and sizes. They
can be small devices flown at low altitudes with the potential to trespass in a land
owner’s airspace. They can be larger and fly at high altitudes alongside manned
aircraft. Drones of all sizes may be operated by individuals or for commercial
purposes. The characteristics of the drone, where it is flown and who the
operator is will affect the property and privacy law that applies to it. Some of the
legal doctrines discussed in this paper will have broader or narrower application,
depending on the scenario in which the drone is operated.
Some of the jobs currently being done by drones have been done by aircraft
for some time, meaning that privacy concerns are not entirely novel. For
example, aircraft are used to deliver pesticides and high-altitude aircraft are used
by the military for surveillance. Similarly, drones may trespass into the airspace
of a landowner but this already happens occasionally with helicopters and hot air
balloons. Drones are different because they combine the flight abilities of aircraft
with the data recording capabilities of computers. Drones are effectively flying
robots that constantly collect and record data. In addition, drones are
significantly different from aircraft because they are more economical to
operate than conventional aircraft and therefore the intrusive capacity of drones
will be accessible to many more actors.26 The occasional intrusion by low-tech
hot air balloon may become the regular intrusion by high-tech drone.
(c) Current Regulatory Framework
Transport Canada regulates private use of drones through issuing Special
Flight Operations Certificates (SFOC).27 Military drones are not regulated by
Transport Canada but other state uses are, including police drones.28
Recreational drones are not regulated. The SFOC process is broad and flexible
and therefore can be used to authorize flights for any type of drone.
A drone is defined, using the term ‘‘unmanned aerial vehicle”, as:
...a power-driven aircraft, other than a model aircraft, that is designed
to fly without a human operator on board.29
25 Handwerk, supra note 16 (quoting Scott Braun).
26 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Drones in Canada” (Ottawa: Privacy
Commissioner ofCanada, 2013) at 13 [OPC, ‘‘Drones”]; Villasenor, supranote 20 at 460.
27 CAR, supra note 7 ss. 602.41, 603.67.
28 Ibid at s. 102.01; Transport Canada, Staff Instruction 623-001, ‘‘Review and processing
of an application for a Special Flight Operations Certificate for the Operation of an
Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) System” (19 November 2014) at 13, online:
<www.tc.gc.ca> [SI2014].
29 CAR, supra note 7 s. 101.01(1).
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This definition should be read together with the definition of ‘‘model
aircraft”. Other than the use to which they are put, there is no practical difference
between drones and model aircraft. A model aircraft is:
...an aircraft, the total weight of which does not exceed 35 kg (77.2
pounds), that is mechanically driven or launched into flight for
recreational purposes and that is not designed to carry persons or other
living creatures.30
Three elements of the definition of model aircraft distinguish it from private
drones that are regulated by SFOCs. First, the maximum take-off weight
(MTOW) of a model aircraft must be less than 35kg. Second, it must only be
used for recreational purposes. Third, it must not carry people or animals.31 The
result of reading these definitions together is that the SFOC process applies to all
commercial uses of drones, and all drones with a MTOW more than 35kg. There
are some exceptions to this general framework. Drones with MTOW less than
2kg, and drones with MTOW less than 25kg used for ‘‘work or research” do not
require a SFOC.32 These exceptions reflect the recommendations of the UAV
Systems Program Design Working Group, which emphasize integration of
drones and some deregulation.33
The regulations allow Transport Canada to issue an SFOC for drones with
any type of payload. For example, video cameras, infrared sensors, and synthetic
aperture radar can all be mounted on a drone.34 The SFOC process only
regulates the payload to the extent that it impacts safety. This includes the impact
on operation of the drone, whether the payload is operated by the pilot, and
whether it poses any danger to people or property on the ground.35 This means
that drones with a variety of privacy invasive payloads may be authorized to fly.
30 Ibid.
31 See also SI2008, supra note 1 at 8.
32 SI2014, supra note 28 at 13, 14. Transport Canada, News Release, ‘‘Simpler rules for
small unmanned aerial vehicles” (5 November 2014) online: Canada News Centre
<news.gc.ca>; DianaMarina Cooper, ‘‘Transport Canada Releases New Framework
for UAV Operations” (27 November 2014), Diana Marina Cooper: Thoughts on tech
law... (blog), online: <dianamarinacooper.com>. Note that the original terms of
reference for the PDWGstated theMTOWboundary would be 35kg, presumably based
on the definition of model aircraft in the Canadian Aviation Regulations. However, the
PDWG has settled on the lower limit of 25kg. See TCCA, supra note 6 at 3 and Phase 1,
supra note 9 at 2.
33 SI2014, supra note 28 at 49. In 2016, Transport Canada is expected to create new and
permanent exceptions for drones under 25kg. The expectation is that these exceptions
will be based on safety concerns and will have different qualifying requirements,
depending on whether the drone is operated in built up or more remote areas. See
Kathryn McGoldrick, ‘‘New drone regulations expected from Transport Canada in
2016” (6 January 2016), Aviation Law Blog, online: <aviationlawblog.ahbl.ca>.
34 See e.g. SI2014, supra note 28 at 8, 9, 45, 46.
35 See e.g. ibid at 18, 20, 24, 25, 34, 44-46.
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As mentioned earlier, the SFOC process is broad and flexible. SFOCs are not
limited to simple systems that involve a single drone flown within visual line of
sight (VLOS) and controlled using a mobile phone. It includes for example,
systems where a single control station may be used to control multiple drones.36
For those systems that are flown within VLOS, there can be multiple visual
observers who communicate information to the pilot who may not have the
drone within VLOS.37 In other cases, visual observers may follow the drone in a
‘‘chase aircraft.”38
The focus of the SFOC process is safety. Safety themes that are emphasized
include: sense & avoid, system maintenance, training for pilots, maintenance
staff and visual observers, radio frequency interference, security of
communication links, and emergency procedures. Transport Canada’s
approach to drones reflects its traditional role regulating manned aircraft. The
certification process adapts its reading of terminology in the Aeronautics Act and
Canadian Aviation Regulations to accommodate the differences between drones
and manned aircraft.39 In general, drones are expected to operate according to
the rules that apply to manned aircraft and in most cases drones should give way
to manned aircraft.40
Authorization for drone flights follows a graduated certification process.
Initially, an applicant will be issued a SFOC for a specific mission with specific
conditions.41 This will restrict the certificate holder to a particular flight plan
executed with a specific model of drone. As the certificate holder develops a
history of successful flights, the authorization granted by the SFOC may be
broadened, for example to include a larger geographic area and longer validity
periods to cover multiple flights.42
The SFOC process does not address privacy directly, though the Staff
Instruction does indicate that the holder of a SFOC must comply with other
legislation governing its activities, including PIPEDA.43 The SFOC process does
look after the interests of property owners in two ways, which may indirectly
affect privacy. First, drone operators must have plans to avoid, and actually
avoid damage to property. This includes obtaining permission to enter property
to retrieve a drone that has crashed.44 Second, some SFOCs include a minimum
36 Ibid at 12, 24.
37 Ibid at 17.
38 Ibid at 118, 121.
39 See e.g. competence requirements for pilots and systemmaintainers in SI2014, ibid at 16,
18.
40 Ibid at 21, 29, 32.
41 Sarah Fitzpatrick & Kenneth Burnett, ‘‘Regulation and use of drones in Canada”
Altitudes (October 2013), online: Canadian Bar Association <www.cba.org>.
42 See generally SI2014, supra note 28 at 38, 39.
43 Ibid at 14; Gersher, supra note 4 at 23; OPC, ‘‘Drones”, supra note 26 at 2.
44 SI2014, supra note 28 at 14, 21, 33, 37, 38, 46, 93, 94.
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vertical and lateral distance that must be maintained during flight in built-up
areas, between the drone and structures or vehicles.45 The repeated emphasis on
avoiding damage to property is in contrast to the lack of emphasis on privacy
rights.
In summary, the SFOC process is adapted from traditional regulation of
manned aircraft. It is broad enough to permit flights of almost any type of drone
with any payload, and for these flights to operate in controlled airspace along
with manned aircraft. The process allows for certificate holders to build on a
history of safe drone flights to obtain more generalized flight authorization.
Privacy is not part of the SFOC assessment process, nor is it something that
Transport Canada expects certificate holders to take into consideration in their
flight planning.
(d) The Future of Drone Regulation
The UAV Systems Program Design Working Group (PDWG) is considering
the future of drone regulation in Canada. As mentioned earlier, the PDWG
started its work in 2010 and is expected to wind up in 2017. The PDWG mandate
comes from its terms of reference and the work plan is based on the plan
developed by the original Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Working Group (UAV-
WG), which completed its work in 2007.
The PDWG’s work is divided into four phases. The four phases are oriented
around developing regulations for different weight categories of drones, and
includes developing regulations for drones operated beyond visual line of sight
(VLOS).46 Phase 1 was completed in March, 2012. Phase 2 should have been
completed in 2014, however the PDWG has yet to release its Phase 2 report.47
One of the problems with Transport Canada’s development of drone regulations
is secrecy. During the writing of this paper, Transport Canada documents on
drone regulation were hard to come by, and some could only be obtained from
third parties, who in turn obtained them through access to information requests.
The UAV-WG’s 2007 report was available on the Transport Canada website as
late as March 2014 but is no longer. In 2015 Transport Canada issued a Notice of
Proposed Amendment for drone regulations and accepted public comments,
which is a welcome improvement in transparency.48 The proposed amendments
are consistent with the PDWG’s work, particularly in the area of deregulation,
however the PDWG reports remain secret.
The PDWG recommendations for Phase 1 are consistent with existing
practices for SFOCs. The underlying assumption is that drones will be fully
45 See e.g. ibid at 82, 102, 105.
46 TCCA, supra note 6 at 3, 4.
47 Ibid at 7.
48 Canadian Aviation Regulations Advisory Council, Notice of Proposed Amendment:
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2015), online: Transport
Canada <wwwapps.tc.gc.ca>.
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integrated into Canadian airspace. They will be able to fly in all classes of
airspace, following the directions of air traffic control.49 The recommendations
emphasize that drones are aircraft.50 In order to reinforce that drones are
aircraft, the PDWG recommends that, like manned aircraft, they be registered,
marked and that owners be required to conform to airworthiness reporting
requirements.51 Also, the PDWG avoided as much as possible creating separate
regulations for drones because the goal is integration with manned aircraft rather
than segregation.52
Of particular interest for this paper is the PDWG’s recommendation that
drones be allowed to operate at low altitudes.53 In general, aircraft and
helicopters may not be operated lower than 1000ft above built-up areas or places
where people are assembled.54 In other situations the minimum altitude is
500ft.55 Low altitude is anything below these minimums. Currently there are
exceptions which allow low altitude flights for, among other things, police
operations, life saving, and aerial photography.56 Because drones are regulated
through SFOCs, they are exempt from the minimum flight altitude regulations,
though the SFOC may contain its own limits on proximity to structures and
vehicles.57 Because the SFOC process is not centrally managed, Transport
Canada is unable to provide details on SFOCs actually issued and it is therefore
not possible to know how often SFOCs include such limits.58 In later phases, the
PDWG will revisit low altitude flight regulations for larger drones and those
flown beyond VLOS.59
In summary, the PDWG is engaging in a rather secretive review of aviation
regulations related to all types of drones. As with the SFOC process described
earlier, there is no consideration of privacy. The PDWG follows the general
themes of the current SFOC process with a focus on deregulation and
integration.
II. DRONE PRIVACY RISKS
Examples of current drone applications show how drones may present
formidable threats to privacy. Keeping these examples in mind, this section will
49 Phase 1, supra note 9 at 2, 17.
50 Ibid at 11, 14.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid at 5.
53 Ibid at 17.
54 CAR, supra note 7 s. 602.14(2)(a).
55 Ibid at ss. 602.14(2)(a), 602.14(2)(b).
56 Ibid at s. 602.15.
57 Ibid at ss. 602.14(2)(a), 602.15(2)(a), 603.65(d), 603.66.
58 Santry, supra note 10.
59 Phase 1, supra note 9 at 17.
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delve into privacy theory and the challenge that new technologies such as drones
present to the dominant theories of privacy that exist in Canadian law. First,
there is an overview of definitions of privacy including those found in Canadian
law. Second, there is a discussion of how the law interacts with new technology.
That discussion will explore at length privacy violations that the dominant legal
theories of privacy do not address and why it is important for the law to
incorporate a theory of privacy that does address these violations. There are two
notable problems that drones pose for privacy law: data aggregation and privacy
in public. Privacy scholars have already considered these problems in relation to
other technology. This paper takes the position that privacy theories addressing
both of these problem must be embedded into Canadian law.
(a) Definitions of Privacy
Privacy is a difficult concept to pin down.60 There are many definitions and
they differ substantially. Some argue that privacy does not protect interests that
are not already protected by other areas of law.61 Others argue that privacy
interests are distinct but privacy is inadequate to protect against the negative
effects of surveillance.62 This is a short overview of some theoretical approaches
to privacy.
The historical starting point in American and Canadian legal scholarship is
the right to be let alone, developed originally by Warren & Brandeis.63 This is in
some ways broader than privacy itself and also too narrow to deal with some
privacy threats.64 The right to be let alone is broader because it demands a
general freedom from interference or regulation, not just interference with
privacy. It is narrower because it does not protect against some clear privacy
violations, for example, disclosure of medical records by one physician to
another without the patient’s consent.65 The right to be let alone implies a sharp
distinction between public and private space.66 Since Warren & Brandeis first
elaborated the idea, courts and scholars in the United States have developed it as
60 Finn, supra note 19 at 185.
61 Colin H. H. McNairn & Alexander K. Scott, Privacy Law in Canada (Markham:
ButterworthsCanada Ltd, 2001) at 6; See alsoRuthGavison, ‘‘Privacy and the Limits of
Law” (1980) 89:3 Yale L.J. 421, at 421.
62 Finn, supra note 19 at 186.
63 McNairn, supra note 61 at 4; Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274, 108
O.R. (3d) 241, [2012] O.J. No. 148 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16 [Tsige]; Neil M. Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, ‘‘Prosser’s Privacy Law: AMixed Legacy” (2010) 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1887
at 1913; See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, ‘‘The Right to Privacy”
(1890) 4:5 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
64 McNairn, supra note 61 at 7-8; Richards, supra note 63 at 1913.
65 McNairn, supra note 61 at 7-8.
66 Ibid at 7; See generally William L. Prosser, ‘‘Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 at 383-
387.
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four separate torts.67 One of these, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, also
exists in Canadian law and will be considered in detail later in the paper.
Another approach to privacy present in Canadian law is the information
control approach. The information control approach does not protect privacy
directly but indirectly by enabling individuals to control their personal
information.68 Information control operates by giving individuals control of
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.69 This is the concept
that underlies Canada’s private sector privacy law which will be considered in
more detail later.70 One limitation is that information control does not address
intrusion into private space, though this is addressed by the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion.71
Building on the information control approach, Gratton argues for a new way
of interpreting the term personal information. Literal interpretation of the term
and the difficulty of determining whether information pertains to an identifiable
individual has led to unwanted outcomes.72 The problem with literal
interpretation is amplified by changing technology, in particular the increasing
volume of personal information, new collection tools, new types of data (e.g.
geographic information) and new techniques for linking individuals to
information.73 Gratton proposes a purposive interpretation of personal
information to ensure that the definition and its application remain consistent
with the purpose of data protection legislation such as Canada’s Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.74 The purpose of PIPEDA
is to protect against risk of harm, which is a function of several variables
including: the circumstances of the situation, intentions of the parties, the kind of
information collected and how the information is processed.75 In Gratton’s view,
only data that poses a risk of harm should be subject to PIPEDA.76 Harm can be
either subjective, such as unwanted perception of observation, or objective, such
as when information is used to discriminate.77 Subjective harm would be
protected through application of PIPEDA to collection and disclosure of
67 See generally Prosser, supra note 66; McNairn, supra note 61 at 5.
68 Michael Power, The Law of Privacy (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2013) at paras.
1.4, 2.1.
69 McNairn, supra note 61 at 5.
70 PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 3; OPC, ‘‘Drones”, supra note 26 at 14.
71 McNairn, supra note 61 at 12.
72 Éloı̈se Gratton, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks (Mark-
ham: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) at 146.
73 Ibid at 21, 24-28, 30-33.
74 Ibid at 146; PIPEDA, supra note 24.
75 Gratton, supra note 72 at 157-158.
76 Ibid at 179.
77 Ibid at 220, 334; Ryan Calo, ‘‘The Boundaries of Privacy Harm” (2011) 86:3 Ind. L.J.
1131 at 1133, cited in Gratton, ibid at 227.
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information, while only objective harm would be protected by PIPEDA’s
application to uses of personal information.78 This approach places responsibility
for preventing harm in the hands of organizations using personal information
and acknowledges that individual control of personal information is a utopic
idea.79
A more philosophical view of privacy is that it protects human dignity or
that it is a right of inviolate personality.80 The human dignity view describes the
protected interest differently from how it is described by Prosser’s privacy torts.
Bloustein illustrates this using the example of a woman giving birth.81 A woman
giving birth does not want an audience other than medical staff and close family,
for reasons broadly described as privacy. For tort law, the objective is to protect
against the harm of mental distress. The inviolate personality view says that the
protected interests are her individuality and human dignity, regardless of the
harm.82
Gavison argues that privacy can be described as concern over accessibility to
others.83 There are three elements of accessibility: the extent to which we are
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us and the
extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.84 Gavison calls these
secrecy, solitude and anonymity.85 Each element presents its own challenges for
understanding privacy and whether a loss of privacy has occurred. With secrecy,
as with the information control approach, information must be about an
individual for a privacy loss to occur.86 Sometimes it is not clear whether
information is about an individual or for example, about the individual’s car or
house.87 Anonymous information, which does not appear to be linked to an
individual, can sometimes be connected to the individual by correlating it with
other known information about the individual or a group to which the individual
belongs.88 There is always a loss of privacy when an individual becomes the
subject of others’ attention, because attention is a primary way of acquiring
78 Gratton, supra note 72 at 217.
79 Ibid at 172-174, 410-417.
80 McNairn, supra note 61 at 10.
81 Edward J. Bloustein, ‘‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser” (1964) 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, at 973.
82 Ibid.
83 Gavison, supra note 61 at 423.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid at 428.
86 Ibid at 430.
87 Ibid at 431; See generally Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Geographical Information as ’Personal
Information’” (2010) 10:2 O.U.C.L.J. 185 at 193-197.
88 Gavison, supra note 61 at 430-31; See also Ciara Bracken-Roche et al, Surveillance
Drones: Privacy Implications of the Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in
Canada (Kingston: Surveillance Studies Centre, Queen’s University, 2014) at 45-54.
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information.89 Privacy is a combination of these three independent and
interrelated elements.90 By thinking about the basis of privacy and addressing
the challenges presented by the three elements of accessibility, it is possible to
establish a coherent notion of privacy that is also a useful legal concept.91
Contextual integrity says that breaches of privacy are better understood as
breaches of context, rather than merely breaches of intimate or sensitive
information.92 There are no areas of life that are not governed by norms of
information flow.93 That is to say, even in public, information is not simply up
for grabs. Contextual integrity has two information norms: norms of
appropriateness and norms of distribution or flow.94 If either norm is violated,
privacy is violated.95 Norms of appropriateness define what is appropriate to
reveal in a particular context, for example in a friendship, to a physician or in a
job interview.96 Norms of distribution, an idea based on distributive justice,
define when it is appropriate for information to flow, either within a context, or
to another context.97 For example, in the context of friendship, a friend ferreting
out information from third parties might not comply with the context’s
distribution norms.98 To assess whether privacy has been violated, it is crucial
to know the context: who is gathering and analyzing information, who is
disclosing it and to whom it is disclosed, the relationships among the parties and
nature of the information.99
(b) Latent Ambiguities
Drones are one of many new technologies that are having a significant
impact on privacy protection. Other technologies appeared before drones and
have already presented challenges to accepted definitions of privacy and to
privacy law. Warren & Brandeis were concerned about the same thing: the
development of instantaneous photography which invaded the privacy to which
they had become accustomed.100 Modern examples include increased use of
89 Gavison, supra note 61 at 432.
90 Ibid at 433-434.
91 See Gavison, ibid at 422, 459, 462-463.
92 HelenNissenbaum, ‘‘Protecting Privacy in an InformationAge: The Problem of Privacy
in Public” (1998) 17 Law & Phil. 559 at 584 [Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy in Public”].
93 Helen Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 79:1 Wash. L. Rev. 119 at
137 [Nissenbaum, ‘‘Contextual Integrity”].
94 Ibid at 138.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid at 138, 142, 143.
97 Ibid at 140-141.
98 Ibid at 142.
99 Ibid at 153-155.
100 Warren, supra note 63 at 195, 206, 211.
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video surveillance by private businesses and mobile phone location tracking
features.101
Drones will also have an impact on property and aviation law though they
are not the first aircraft to do so. In the twentieth century, as manned flight
became more common, it challenged existing concepts of property law. Prior to
manned flight, a land owner owned everything above and below his land, from
heaven down to hell.102 This previously ‘clear’ principle of law became more
complicated with regular overflights by aircraft. It was desirable for aircraft to be
able to fly freely over private land without being liable for trespass in the land
owner’s airspace.103 Eventually the law changed and an upper limit was imposed
on the surface owner’s rights in airspace.104 As will be seen later in this paper,
some of the same debates about the extent of a land owner’s rights in airspace are
likely to reoccur in relation to drones.
The interaction between technology and the law, be it aircraft or surveillance
cameras, is not well understood.105 Some argue that new technologies require
special treatment in the law.106 Others say that there is really nothing new and
that it makes no more sense to have specialized law for a given technology than it
would to have specialized law for horses.107 Lessig has long made the case that
new technology reveals latent ambiguities in the law that existed all along. New
technology shows that existing legal doctrines are incomplete and that the gaps
need to be filled in to address the challenges posed by the new technology.108
Calo makes the case for moderate exceptionalism, saying that technology can be
considered exceptional if it requires a systematic change to the law in order to
replace or reproduce an existing balance of values.109 Drones, like aircraft and
the internet, are challenging existing doctrines in property law and privacy law.
101 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Overt Video
Surveillance in the Private Sector (Ottawa: Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2008) at 1-
2 [OPC, ‘‘Overt”]. See also Ian Kerr & Jena McGill, ‘‘Emanations, Snoop Dogs and
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” (2007) 52:3 Crim. L.Q. 392 at 393.
102 Didow v. Alberta Power Ltd., 1988 CarswellAlta 109, 88 A.R. 250, [1988] A.J. No. 620
(Alta. C.A.) at para. 8, leave to appeal refused 1989 CarswellAlta 809 (S.C.C.) [Didow].
103 Stuart Banner,Who Owns the Sky? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) at 69.
104 Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v. Skyviews General Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 479 (U.K.) at 488
[Bernstein].
105 Banner, supra note 103 at 3.
106 Ryan Calo, ‘‘Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103:3 Cal. L. Rev. 513 at
550-551 [Calo, ‘‘Robotics”].
107 Ibid at 551-552; See e.g. Banner, supra note 103 at 223.
108 Lawrence Lessig,Code andOther Laws of Cyberspace (NewYork: Basic Books, 1999) at
25.
109 Calo, ‘‘Robotics”, supra note 106 at 552-553.
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(c) Law and Changing Technology
Drones pose two different but related challenges. One of these is data
aggregation and the other is privacy in public. These challenges emerged earlier
than drones, with the popularization of other technologies, such as the internet,
digital cameras and mobile phone location tracking. The popularization of
private drones will continue to strain existing privacy protections. This section of
the paper will argue that to meet the privacy challenge of drones it is necessary to
find a way to protect against data aggregation and to protect privacy in public.
Data aggregation, also called data mining or profiling, is a technique of
matching disparate data sets and drawing inferences to learn new things or make
predictions about the subject.110 Data aggregation brings a whole new meaning
to the data sets that are matched.111 Data mining allows Netflix to predict films
customers might be interested in watching and helps Amazon maintain its supply
chain.112 Data mining also enables discovery of information about individuals
that those individuals may not have wanted to reveal and may not be aware are
revealed, such as predicting a Facebook user’s sexuality or guessing her Social
Security Number.113 While it may be obvious to the reader why this kind of data
aggregation is undesirable, it is not clear that dominant theories of privacy either
recognize these problems, or can distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable data aggregation. Where personal or sensitive information is
used in aggregation, it easy to see the privacy violation. It is harder for dominant
privacy theories to grapple with the fact that non-personal information can be
usefully aggregate in a way that can threaten an individual’s interests.114
Gratton identifies data aggregation as one of the most important changes
that technology brings to the privacy landscape.115 Another important change
identified by Gratton is the volume of data collected and stored.116 With a
110 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, ‘‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of
Privacy in Public Places” (2000) 50:3 U.T.L.J. 305 at 341; Nissenbaum, ‘‘Contextual
Integrity”, supra note 93 at 95.
111 Gratton, supra note 72 at 34.
112 Ibid at 36; Nissenbaum, ‘‘Contextual Integrity”, supra note 93 at 152-153.
113 Gratton, supra note 72 at 36, 38.
114 Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy in Public”, supra note 92 at 587; Gratton, supra note 72 at 27, 32;
Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 341; OPC, ‘‘Drones”, supra note 26 at 14. For a
discussion of when information derived from data aggregation becomes personal
information under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
see Éloı̈seGratton, ‘‘Personalization,Analytics and Sponsored Services: TheChallenges
of Applying PIPEDA to Online Tracking and Profiling Activities” (2010) 8:2 C.J.L.T.
299; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Policy Position on Online
Behavioural Advertising, (Ottawa: Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2012), online:
<www.priv.gc.ca>.
115 Gratton, supranote 72 at 21, 34-38; See alsoNissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy inPublic”, supranote
92 at 576-577.
116 Gratton, supra note 72 at 21, 27.
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greater volume of data, more data aggregation is possible and more accurate
inferences can be drawn. There is a greater volume of data not only because there
is more of the same stuff or because digital storage allows indefinite data
retention. There is a greater volume of data because of new types of data and new
techniques for collecting it.117 The concept of an IP address as personal
information is relatively new, though commonly used as an example in
discussions of privacy and technology.118 Other new types of information
include web browsing patterns, user names, email addresses, and location
information.119 New techniques of collecting information include mobile phones,
browser cookies, thermal imaging, automated toll collection systems for roads
and transit, and RFID tags.120 The sensors that drones can carry are also a new
technique of collecting information.
In the online world and the offline world, we give away information about
ourselves, both willingly and unwillingly. Some of the information, which Kerr
calls emanations, is not susceptible to the individual’s control.121 An emanation
is any thing that flows from an individual’s body or property.122 Examples
include odours, DNA from flaking skin and hair, fingerprints, heat radiating
from a person’s body or from a building, and mobile phone signals.123
Emanations provide useful clues for police investigations, even enough to
justify a search of a person or property.124 Emanations are also useful clues for
private actors wanting to build a profile of individuals going about their daily
affairs.
People go about their daily affairs in private and in public. The dominant
theories of privacy protect that which is in private and undisclosed, and often do
not protect that which happens in public. A person who goes to the corner store
to buy bread and milk can expect to be seen by neighbours as he comes and goes,
and can also expect that other people in the store may know what he bought.125
According to the dominant theories of privacy, when a person goes out in public,
he waives the right to privacy.126 Several scholars have argued that the sharp
117 See ibid at 21, 30.
118 See ibid at 31.
119 Ibid at 30-32.
120 Ibid at 28-30.
121 Kerr, supra note 101 at 393.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 See e.g. R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.) at paras. 4-6, 27, 58; See also R. v.
Brown, 2008 SCC 18, 2008 CarswellAlta 523, 2008 CarswellAlta 524, (sub nom. R. v.
Kang-Brown) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18 (S.C.C.).
125 Austl, Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and
Privacy (Report No 11) (Canberra: AustralianGovernment Publishing Service, 1979) at
125 cited in Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 321.
126 Ibid at 320; Chris D. L. Hunt, ‘‘Privacy in the Common Law: ACritical Appraisal of the
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distinction between private and public space is not feasible and does not
accurately reflect either individuals’ own judgements about privacy or how they
behave in public.127
If privacy in public does not exist, then a reasonable person must go to great
lengths to preserve her privacy. Paton-Simpson argues that the person who goes
to such great lengths is not in fact reasonable, but paranoid. Paton-Simpson uses
the example of Prudence to show the kind of behaviour necessary to preserve
privacy. Prudence keeps her curtains closed day and night. She does not speak
with friends in cafés. She shreds all documents before discarding them. She buys
all personal items via mail order, lest she be observed by others buying them, and
receives them addressed to a pseudonym at a post office box. Prudence never
goes to specialist health clinics and never attends controversial political
meetings.128 If Prudence were to leave her curtains open, she could not
complain about people looking in through her window. If she discusses sensitive
subjects with friends in a café, she cannot expect people nearby not to overhear.
In spite of these ostensibly common sense arguments, ordinary people who do
not behave like Prudence do not intend to waive their privacy rights when they
go out in public.129
Private and public spaces cannot be sharply distinguished. In reality there are
degrees of private and public.130 As an example, consider a locker room, a
church and a gay bar. Individuals in these different contexts assess how public
the space is and adjust their behaviour accordingly.131 For example, while it is
acceptable to take photos in the street, this is not acceptable in the locker room
context, even though that space is to some degree public, by virtue of there being
others around. Dominant theories of privacy would say that if a man’s
attendance at a gay bar was revealed to his church congregation, there would no
privacy violation. In reality, this view is at odds with ordinary people’s intuitions
and judgments about these spaces.132
Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v. Tsige” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s L.J. 661 at
674.
127 UK, Home Office, Report of the Committee on Data Protection (London: HerMajesty’s
Stationery Office, 1978) at paras. 31.02-31.05, cited in Gratton, supra note 72 at 50-51;
Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 308, 321; Nissenbaum, ‘‘Contextual Integrity”, supra
note 93 at 134; Hunt, supra note 126 at 676, 679-680, 693.
128 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 305-306, 314-315, 320. Paton-Simpson cites both
American andCanadian jurisprudence, arguing that thoughCanadian courts have often
expectations such as these on Prudence, there are also some cases showing a more
nuanced view of the distinction between private and public.
129 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 346; See e.g. Hunt, supra note 126 at 676.
130 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 322; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lenah
Game Meats Pty Ltd., [2001] HCA 63 (Australia) at para. 42, cited in Hunt, supra note
126 at 682.
131 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 323.
132 Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy in Public”, supra note 92 at 584.
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A number of factors affect the degree of privacy in public spaces. These are
information dispersion, anonymity and impermanence.133 Information
dispersion means that publicly observable activities are dispersed over space
and time. Individuals normally expect that their public activities are only being
casually observed by others. This is in contrast to systematic observation which
can produce a detailed profile of an individual’s life.134 Anonymity means that in
most cases, those who casually observe someone in public do not actually know
that person.135 The result is that any information gained about that individual
does not contribute to building a profile. Impermanence means that what
happens in public and what others observe, is mostly transient.136 That is, an
individual passes through the pharmacy, buys a pregnancy test kit, and then
moves on. Those who observed this also move on and the event vanishes into
history.137 New technology reduces privacy in public by reducing the influence of
these three factors.138 The earlier example of how it is unacceptable to take
photographs in a locker room shows the impact of technology on these three
factors. While individuals in a locker room would expect to be seen by others,
they do expect not to be recorded, and they expect that any observations will
fade into history.
Underlying the claim that there is no privacy in public are flawed
assumptions about consent and voluntariness. The reasoning about consent is
as follows: since it is generally true that there is less privacy in public than in
private places, then an individual who goes out in public knowing this, implicitly
consents to whatever intrusions or publicity that follow.139 For example,
someone who talks over the fence to their neighbour risks being overheard by
another neighbour and has no claim against the eavesdropper.140 This
assumption about consent equates knowledge of a risk with consent to suffer
the consequences if the risked event occurs.141 Equating knowledge of a risk with
consent to its occurrence in turn assumes that the choice to go out in public is
voluntary.142 In reality we must go out in public to get to work, see doctors, buy
groceries and participate in civic life, including controversial political
meetings.143 Attending political meetings may be optional but the other
activities are not, and opting not to participate in political meetings limits the
133 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 321.
134 Ibid at 323-324.
135 Ibid at 325-326.
136 Ibid at 327.
137 Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy in Public”, supra note 92 at 576, 595.
138 Ibid at 576-577. See also Gratton, supra note 72 at 21, 27, 50-52.
139 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 332; Hunt, supra note 126 at 676.
140 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 333.
141 Ibid at 332.
142 Ibid at 337; Hunt, supra note 126 at 677.
143 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 338; Hunt, supra note 126 at 677.
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individual’s exercise of other rights, including freedom of association and
expression.144
In summary, privacy law needs to address data aggregation and privacy in
public. Approaches to privacy that ignore the impact of technology are not able
address these problems. Theories of privacy that look at information or events in
isolation will not protect against data aggregation. Theories of privacy that
assume a sharp divide between private and public will not protect privacy in the
way we are accustomed to, as we go about our daily affairs, moving from one
context to another. The dominant approaches to privacy do protect privacy, in a
world where Prudence goes to the drug store to buy a pregnancy test kit and
when she leaves, the event fades into history. However, this is no longer the
world we live in. Prudence’s visit to the drug store is recorded, maybe forever,
and likewise for her other activities in public. Privacy theory must accurately
account for the complex reality of an individual’s expectations: that for example,
it should be possible to use location features of a mobile phone, without having
one’s movements recorded and used to build a digital profile. Drones represent
the next step in an increased capacity to interfere with individuals’ privacy. If
drones continue to be financially attractive to deploy, as it is expected they will
be, then the frequency and intensity of this interference will increase. The threats
caused by data aggregation and lack of privacy in public have already strained
privacy law and will continue to do so as drones with their arrays of sensors take
to the sky.
III. LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST DRONE PRIVACY INVASION
(a) Property Law
This section will discuss the possibility of a land owner using property law to
protect his privacy against drones. Protection of privacy depends to some extent
on ownership and control of property.145 To provide background, the discussion
will start with a review of the nature and extent of the surface owner’s rights in
airspace. Depending on the nature and extent of rights in airspace, the surface
owner may have a claim in trespass or nuisance against drones that enter his
airspace. These types of claims may be useful in some situations, even though
they do not address privacy invasions from airspace outside the surface owner’s
control.
144 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 342; Finn, supra note 19 at 190; Ryan Calo, ‘‘Robots
and Privacy” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey, eds, Robot Ethics: The
Ethical andSocial Implications ofRobotics (Cambridge:MITPress, 2012) 187 at 190. For
a longer discussion of the values that are affected by norms of information flow, see
Nissenbaum, ‘‘Contextual Integrity”, supra note 93 at 147-151.
145 Paton-Simpson, supra note 110 at 306, 307.
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(i) Property Rights in Airspace
Before considering how an occupier or land owner might use property law to
protect her privacy from drones it is necessary to establish what rights she has in
the airspace above her land. As mentioned earlier, the legal principle used to be:
the surface owner owns everything above and below her land, from heaven down
to hell.146 As manned flight became more common in the 20th century, courts in
the UK, US, and Canada all made decisions limiting the surface owner’s rights in
airspace.147
At least one British judge stated that the principle of ownership of airspace
up to heaven was fanciful and absurd since it would result in trespass ‘‘...being
committed by a satellite every time it passes over a suburban garden.”148 Aside
from absurdity, the benefits of aircraft were too great to allow them to be
hindered by surface owners.149 In the modern world of aircraft, satellites and
‘‘visits to the moon”, an unlimited right to airspace by the surface owner made
no sense.150 Besides, overflights by aircraft several thousand feet above the
surface could have little impact on the surface owner below.151 The rights of the
surface owner and the right of the public to make use of the air were balanced by
putting an upper limit on the surface owner’s rights.152
Though an upper limit was imposed, where that limit is has not been clearly
defined.153 In Causby, the Supreme Court of the United States described the
extent of airspace rights in three different ways:
1. Extending to the ‘‘immediate reaches” of the surface.
2. Including as much airspace as the surface owner can use or occupy.
3. Extending as far as necessary to ensure the surface owner’s full enjoyment
of the land.154
These descriptions of the extent of rights in airspace have all appeared in
Canadian decisions either directly or in citing UK decisions.155 In Canada, the
146 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 8.
147 Manitoba v. Air Canada, 1978 CarswellMan 120, 86 D.L.R. (3d) 631, [1978]M.J. No. 15
(Man. C.A.) at para. 15, affirmed 1980 CarswellMan 170, 1980 CarswellMan 177
(S.C.C.) [Air Canada]; Bernstein, supra note 104 at 488; See generally United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1946).
148 Bernstein, supra note 104 at 487.
149 Banner, supra note 103 at 240, 251, 293.
150 Air Canada, supra note 147 at para. 15; Lacroix v. R., 1953 CarswellNat 272, [1954] Ex.
C.R. 69 (Can. Ex. Ct.) at 73 [Ex. C.R.] [Lacroix].
151 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 25.
152 Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada
Limited, 2014) at 95; Bernstein, supra note 104 at 487, 488.
153 Ziff, supra note 152 at 95.
154 Banner, supra note 103 at 254, 255.
155 Lacroix, supra note 150 at 75; Bernstein, supra note 104 at 488;Didow, supra note 102 at
paras. 20, 24, 32, 34, 37.
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courts have found interference with the surface owner’s rights at heights of
50ft156 and 70ft.157 Other decisions have found interference without mentioning
the height.158 None of the Canadian or UK cases involved intrusions by aircraft.
Courts in the United States have decided cases involving aircraft interference
with the surface owner’s rights, both for and against surface owners. In
American law, the ‘‘fixed height theory” holds that airspace rights extend up to
the minimum safe altitude for flight, which is 500ft above the surface.159 The
fixed height theory has not been consistently applied by American courts.160 The
result is that, like Canada, the extent of the surface owner’s rights in the airspace
remain unclear. Cahoon argues that the fixed height theory is based on an
incorrect reading of Causby and in any case fails to protect the surface owner’s
rights when the intrusion is above the minimum safe altitude for flight.161 If this
is the case at 500ft then it is even more true if the surface owner’s rights extend
only to 70ft. In Canada, the minimum safe altitude for flight in built-up areas is
1000ft above the highest obstacle and everywhere else is 500ft above the highest
obstacle.162 If the minimum safe altitude for flight was a guide for the upper limit
of the surface owner’s rights in airspace, those rights would extend much further
than currently contemplated in Canadian jurisprudence.
The nature of the surface owner’s rights in airspace, which is a distinct
question from the extent of those rights, is also not clear.163 In Lacroix, the
plaintiff sought compensation for what he claimed was an expropriation of an
easement or servitude in the airspace above his land, for flights landing and
taking off at what was then called Dorval International Airport.164 The court
held that there could be no expropriation of the airspace because airspace was res
omnium communis and therefore not susceptible of ownership.165 If Lacroix did
not own the airspace, then the Crown could not have expropriated it. This
156 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 2.
157 Kingsbridge Development Inc. v. Hanson Needler Corp., 1990 CarswellOnt 649, 71 O.R.
(2d) 636, [1990] O.J. No. 1070 (Ont. H.C.), additional reasons 1990 CarswellOnt 981
(Ont. H.C.) [Kingsbridge].
158 Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd. v. Berkley House (Docklands Developments) Ltd.,
[1987] 2 E.G.L.R. 173 (U.K.) at 174 [Anchor Brewhouse];Kelsen v. Imperial TobaccoCo.,
[1957] 2 Q.B. 334 (Eng. Q.B.) at 335, 336 [Kelsen].
159 Colin Cahoon, ‘‘Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land” (1990) 56
J. Air L. & Com. 157 at 171, 172, 181, 191, 197.
160 Ibid at 182, 187, 188, 191.
161 Ibid at 171, 172, 189, 196, 197. See generally,Aaron v.UnitedStates, 311F.2d 798 (Ct.Cl.,
1963); Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88 (Ct. Cl., 1981).
162 CAR, supra note 7 s. 602.14(2).
163 Franklin O Leger, ‘‘Air Rights and The Air Space Act” (1985) 34 U.N.B.L.J. 39 at 46;
Ziff, supra note 152 at 96.
164 Lacroix, supra note 150 at 71, 72. Dorval is now called Pierre Elliott Trudeau
International Airport.
165 Lacroix, supra note 150 at 76.
86 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [14 C.J.L.T.]
decision denies ownership rights in airspace for the surface owner, though the
court did allow that the surface owner had a limited right in airspace, limited to
that which he could ‘‘...possess or occupy for the use and enjoyment of his
land.”166 Somewhat contradictory to this decision is the Aeronautics Act which
implies that the federal Crown has authority to impose an easement on airspace
adjacent to an aerodrome through zoning regulations.167 The zoning regulations
for Dorval Airport included height restrictions on buildings on adjacent land to
allow aircraft to take-off and land safely.168 The Aeronautics Act does not refer
to zoning regulations as expropriation, nor does it mention easements or
servitudes, yet the effect of the Minister’s zoning power is similar. It may not be
possible to imply ownership rights in airspace based on the Minister’s zoning
power, however it does illustrate an inconsistent understanding of the nature of
airspace rights in Canadian law.
Twenty years after Lacroix, the Manitoba Court of Appeal made a similar
decision. In Air Canada, the court affirmed that airspace was res communis, and
held that the surface owner’s rights in airspace merely prevented others from
acquiring exclusive rights to the airspace, an event which would prevent the
surface owner from using his own land.169 Again, this decision clearly denies
ownership rights in airspace.170
In contrast to these decisions, more than 40 years before Lacroix, the
Supreme Court of Canada in Iredale recognized strata ownership. The court held
that a room, not resting on the soil and supported only by the building beneath
it, could be treated as ‘‘land”.171 This implies that it could be leased or alienated
like any other land. Strata ownership suggests that the nature of rights in
airspace is fuller than the decisions described above have allowed. Modern
statutes in some provinces confirm that airspace parcels can be severed from the
surface and treated as land.172 In those provinces airspace parcels can form the
basis of condominium land grants.173
166 Ibid.
167 Hugh R Smart, ‘‘Lacroix v. The Queen” (1955) 2:2 McGill L.J. 154 at 159, 160. The
relevant provisions of the currentAeronautics Actmatch those in force at the time Smart
was writing; Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 ss. 5.4(2), 5.4(3).
168 Smart, supra note 176 at 160. For current zoning regulations, seeMontreal International
Airport Zoning Regulations, C.R.C., c. 96, ss. 2, 5 (2015).
169 Air Canada, supra note 147 at para. 15.
170 While a few other decisions have mentioned Lacroix, none have advanced the common
law understanding of the nature of rights in airspace. Two of these decisions are
considered in this paper: Air Canada, supra note 147 and Didow, supra note 102. Other
cases mentioning Lacroix include Bridges Brothers Ltd. v. Forest Protection Ltd., 1976
CarswellNB 96, 14 N.B.R. (2d) 91, [1976] N.B.J. No. 92 (N.B. Q.B.) and Ramey v.
Canada, 1986 CarswellNat 86, 1986 CarswellNat 86F, [1987] 1 F.C. 552, [1986] F.C.J.
No. 685 (Fed. T.D.), additional reasons 1987 CarswellNat 1161 (Fed. T.D.).
171 Iredale v. Loudon, 1908 CarswellOnt 808, 40 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) at 333 [S.C.R.], cited in
Leger, supra note 163 at 44; Ziff, supra note 152 at 95.
172 See e.g. Air Space Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 109 ss. 1-3, 6(1); Leger, supra note 163 at 46.
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One of the leading Canadian cases on the extent and nature of rights in
airspace is Didow. In that case, Haddad J. conducted a thorough review of the
Canadian and UK jurisprudence. Though not providing complete clarity, Didow
does provide some noteworthy observations. First, the surface owner does not
have rights in the airspace all the way to heaven, as has already been seen.174
Second, the airspace above that which is necessary for the surface owner’s use, is
‘‘public domain”.175 The court’s reasoning seems to hinge on the need to balance
the public’s right to higher altitude airspace with the surface owner’s right to full
enjoyment of her land.176 Didow was a case of trespass by the arms of power
poles, not by aircraft, so this reasoning on the extent of airspace rights may be
obiter.
The ultimate extent and nature of rights in airspace remains unclear. With
most aircraft flying above the minimum safe altitude, the Canadian courts have
had no opportunities to consider the ownership, use, and occupation of
airspace.177 One thing that is clear is that the surface owner’s rights in airspace do
not extend to heaven. The multiple descriptions in Causby and other decisions of
the extent of the rights in airspace are confusing. It is difficult to know if the
courts mean the same thing in using different phrases, or if they have entirely
different concepts in mind. Based on decisions such as Didow, rights extend up to
at least 70ft above the surface, perhaps higher if the minimum safe altitude for
flight is taken into consideration. It would be too much to say that ownership is
the nature of the right of surface owners, based on Iredale and statutes such as
the Air Space Act. These assume that either the surface owner has severed the
airspace from the surface, or that a building with multiple tenancies exists.
Nevertheless, this is worth noting. Ziff suggests that the nature of the rights could
be possessory or usufructuary.178 The decision in Didow lends weight to the idea
of possessory rights since there could be no claim in trespass otherwise. Iredale
implies that without structures or airspace parcels, the nature of the right is
something less than possessory, as suggested in Lacroix and Air Canada.
However this would contradict Didow and the other trespass cases.
(ii) Trespass
Trespass is an unauthorized interference with possession.179 This means that
whoever is in possession of the land, whether owner or lessee, can make a claim
in trespass.180 The trespass must be intentional but there is no need to
173 Eugene J Morris, ‘‘Air Rights are ’Fertile Soil’” (1969) 1:3 Urban Lawyer 247, at 259,
cited in Leger, supra note 163 at 52.
174 Didow, supra note 102 at paras. 24, 37.
175 Ibid at para. 37.
176 Ibid at paras. 24, 29, 31.
177 See also Leger, supra note 163 at 46.
178 Ziff, supra note 152 at 96.
179 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 6.
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demonstrate harm.181 It is debatable whether negligence or recklessness meet the
threshold of intention.182
The classic example of trespass is a person entering land or placing a chattel
there.183 Firing a gun across another’s land is a trespass.184 A bullet travelling
through the surface owner’s airspace without ever touching the land may be
analogous to a drone. Both are chattels and are directed by someone who is not
the surface owner. A balloon is also analogous to a drone and may be considered
a trespass when it passes through airspace without ever touching the surface.185
In Bernstein, the plaintiff made a claim in trespass against a defendant who
he alleged had flown over his land in an aircraft and taken pictures of his
house.186 Though it was not proven, Giffiths J. felt that the aircraft most likely
did enter the airspace over Lord Bernstein’s land at some point.187 The court
denied the claim, primarily on the grounds that the surface owner’s rights in
airspace do not extend to heaven, and therefore not far enough to deny aircraft
passage through the airspace above the land.188 A factor that influenced the
decision is the UK’s Civil Aviation Act, which explicitly denied the possibility of
trespass or nuisance claims for overflights of aircraft, where the overflight was at
a reasonable height above the surface.189 Though Lord Bernstein’s claim was
denied, the court allowed that if an aircraft flew low enough to interfere with the
surface owner’s ordinary use of his land, then there may be a trespass.190
Griffiths J.’s reference to ‘‘ordinary use of the land” should probably be
understood as a way of describing the extent of the surface owner’s rights in
airspace, rather than describing the nature of the right or the requirements of
trespass. As mentioned above, trespass is interference with possession and it is
not necessary to show interference with a particular use of the land. Bernstein has
been accepted by the Canadian courts.191
Another factor that may have influenced the court, and one of particular
interest for drones, is Giffiths J.’s opinion that the plaintiff was not concerned
about the trespass as much as the photographs.192 The court was sympathetic to
180 Lewis N. Klar, Tort Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2012) at
111, 112.
181 Ibid at 110, 114.
182 Ibid at 119; See generally David Elvin & Jonathan Karas, Unlawful Interference with
Land, 2d ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2002) at paras. 1-036 - 1-039.
183 Klar, supra note 180 at 116.
184 Ibid at 118.
185 Elvin, supra note 182 at 1-017.
186 Bernstein, supra note 104 at 483.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid at 487, 488, 489.
189 Ibid at 486, 488.
190 Ibid at 486.
191 SeeAirCanada, supranote 147 at paras. 14, 15;Didow, supranote 102 at paras. 27, 32, 36.
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this concern but noted that the plaintiff would have no claim if the photograph
had been taken from the street.193 In obiter, the court seems to have foreseen the
privacy risks of drones:
. . . if the circumstances were such that a plaintiff was subjected to the
harassment of constant surveillance of his house from the air,
accompanied by the photographing of his every activity, I am far
from saying that the court would not regard such a monstrous invasion
of his privacy as an actionable nuisance for which they would give
relief.194
There are some claims for trespass as a result of intrusion into airspace which
are consistently allowed by the courts. These are cases where a structure on one
person’s land intrudes into the airspace possessed by his neighbour.195 Examples
include cranes,196 signs,197 extractor fans198 and power lines.199
Lewvest and Anchor Brewhouse provide good explanations for why intrusion
into airspace constitutes interference with possession. The facts of both cases are
similar. The defendants erected construction cranes on their land and the booms
of the cranes intruded into the airspace of their neighbours.200 In both cases the
courts held that the defendants were trespassing,201 despite the courts’ misgivings
about the plaintiffs’ motives or behaviour.202 In Lewvest, the court noted that the
defendants would save money by intruding on their neighbour’s airspace.203 If
the defendant could gain economic advantage by using his neighbour’s property,
then it would be a form of expropriation for the court to deny the plaintiff a
remedy.204 While Anchor Brewhouse does not mention economic advantage, the
court said something very similar: ‘‘If an adjoining owner places a structure on
192 Bernstein, supra note 104 at 488.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid at 489.
195 Ibid at 486, Didow, supra note 102 at para. 34.
196 See Lewvest Ltd. v. Scotia Towers Ltd., 1981 CarswellNfld 187, 126 D.L.R. (3d) 239,
[1981]N.J.No. 220 (Nfld. T.D.) [Lewvest]; But seeKingsbridge, supra note 157where the
court held that a crane intruding into the neighbour’s airspace was a nuisance, not a
trespass.
197 See Kelsen, supra note 158.
198 See Laiqat v. Majid and others, [2005] EWHC 1305 (QB) (U.K.).
199 See Didow, supra note 102.
200 Lewvest, supra note 196 at para. 1; Anchor Brewhouse, supra note 158 at 174.
201 Lewvest, supra note 196 at paras. 4, 16; Anchor Brewhouse, supra note 158 at 175.
202 Lewvest, supranote 196 at paras. 7-9, 12, 14, 15;AnchorBrewhouse, supranote 158 at 178.
According toKlar, the possessor is entitled to refuse permission to enter on his land, and
has no obligation to accommodate, even if it causes great expense or inconvenience to
another: Klar, supra note 180 at 114.
203 Lewvest, supra note 196 at para. 7.
204 Ibid at paras. 9, 13; Ziff, supra note 152 at 95, 96.
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his...land that overhangs his neighbour’s land, he thereby takes into his
possession air space to which his neighbour is entitled.”205 Both judgments
assume the nature of rights in airspace is possessory. By intruding into the
neighbour’s airspace, a person takes what belongs to his neighbour, as his own,
and this is a trespass. Also noteworthy is that both cases rejected the idea of
balancing the plaintiff’s rights with the public’s right to use the airspace.206 In
these cases, unlike Bernstein, the benefit of limiting the surface owner’s rights
would not be in favour of the public, but in favour of the defendant, who is
simply another private party.
As mentioned earlier, Didow is a leading Canadian case on intrusion into
airspace. In Didow, the plaintiff made a claim for trespass after the defendant
built a power line next to his land, with the poles intruding into his airspace.207
The court found in favour of the plaintiff.208 Didow seems to be a case affirming
incremental change in the common law of trespass into airspace. Didow affirms,
in contrast to some earlier jurisprudence, that intrusion into airspace by a
permanent structure is a trespass, not a nuisance and that harm need not be
shown.209 In obiter, Haddad J. mentions that transient intrusions into airspace,
including swinging cranes, would still be a nuisance.210 In Kingsbridge, the
Ontario High Court of Justice agreed with Haddad J. on this point.211 Because of
this difference between Kingsbridge and Lewvest, whether a transient intrusion by
a drone would be a trespass or a nuisance is not clear.
Bernstein did not foreclose the possibility that low-altitude flight by aircraft
could be a trespass. To the extent that drones are analogous to aircraft, which
may depend on their size, this leaves the door open. To succeed with such a claim
the surface owner will have to establish that she has a possessory interest in the
airspace used by the drone. Didow and Iredale help in this regard. It is reasonable
to say that the lower the flight, the more likely a court will find an interference
with the surface owner’s rights. It may even be possible in Canada to claim rights
in airspace as high as the minimum safe altitude for flight. Aside from the
question of the extent and nature of rights in airspace, the major stumbling block
for a trespass claim is the distinction between permanent and transient intrusions
in Kingsbridge. It could be argued that there is no distinction between transient
205 Anchor Brewhouse, supra note 158 at 175.
206 Lewvest, supra note 196 at paras. 6, 12; Anchor Brewhouse, supra note 158 at 175.
207 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 2.
208 Ibid at paras. 1, 5, 39, 42.
209 Ibid at paras. 10-12, 20, 24, 39; Ziff, supra note 152 at 96, briefly discusses how the nature
of the right, be it possessory or something else, would affect whether trespass or nuisance
would be the appropriate action for intrusion, and the implication for whether harm
must be shown.
210 Didow, supra note 102 at para. 41.
211 Kingsbridge, supra note 157.
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and permanent intrusions at the surface-level, therefore there is no reason for this
distinction in airspace.
(iii) Nuisance
Nuisance is unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land.212
The underlying principle is that a person should use her property in a way that
does not injure the property of her neighbours.213 The possessor of land,
including the owner or lessee, may bring a nuisance claim against anyone causing
a nuisance, not only adjacent neighbours.214 Unlike trespass, nuisance requires
harm.215 Fault is not necessary for nuisance.216 In evaluating a nuisance claim
the factors that will be considered by the court are: the type and severity of the
harm, its duration, the character of the neighbourhood and the sensitivity of the
plaintiff’s use of the land. The court will also consider the utility of the
defendant’s activities.217 In this section the focus will be on the severity of harm
as well as the utility of the defendant’s conduct.
Types of harm recognized by nuisance include damage to the land as well as
interference with an easement, interference with profiting from the fruits of the
land, and discomfort or inconvenience.218 Whatever type of harm, it must be
serious and something that the ordinary occupier would not tolerate.219 A minor
discomfort or inconvenience is not likely to be considered a nuisance.220 The
most relevant type of harm for transient intrusions by drone would be discomfort
and inconvenience. With this type of harm distinguishing trivial from serious is
not always easy.221 Using land for an isolation hospital for infectious diseases
would not be a nuisance to neighbours but a bawdy house would be,222 though it
seems the discomfort would be similar in these cases. One explanation for the
different results may be the utility of the defendant’s conduct, which will be
discussed below, though this is not always explicitly stated by the courts.223
212 AllenMLinden&Bruce Feldthusen,Canadian Tort Law, 9th ed (Markham: LexisNexis
Canada Inc, 2011) at 569.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid at 580, 592.
215 Ibid at 579.
216 Ibid at 589.
217 Ibid at 580.
218 Ibid at 578.
219 Ibid at 578, 579.
220 Ibid at 580.
221 Ibid at 581.
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223 See e.g. Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 (U.K. H.L.);
Shuttleworth v. Vancouver General Hospital, 1927 CarswellBC 5, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 573,
[1927]B.C.J.No. 71 (B.C. S.C.);Thompson-Schwab v.Costaki, [1956] 1W.L.R. 335 (Eng.
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Spying or surveillance is not a nuisance except where it is done deliberately for
the purpose of harassment.224
There is some overlap between nuisance and the torts of harassment and
intrusion upon seclusion. The latter, at least in part, grew out of the nuisance
jurisprudence involving invasions of privacy.225 It is not clear whether the tort of
harassment exists as a standalone tort in Canada.226
There are two different ways the defendant’s activities will be considered.
Though fault is not necessary for nuisance, where the defendant’s conduct is
malicious, it could turn activities that are otherwise not a nuisance into viable
claims for nuisance.227 An example is noise that would otherwise not be loud
enough to be a nuisance, but when done with malicious intent could be a
nuisance.228 It is easy to see how privacy invasions which are not serious enough
for a nuisance claim become a nuisance when done with the purpose of
harassment. The other way in which the defendant’s conduct is considered is in
its value to the community. An example is a highway: ‘‘...their utility for the
public good far outweighs the disruption and injury which is visited upon some
adjoining lands.”229 As seen earlier, the benefits of aircraft were considered
significant enough to limit the surface owner’s rights in airspace. Depending on
the commercial uses to which drones are put, and the severity of nuisance they
cause to property owners, nuisance claims against drones may meet the same
fate.
Though Kingsbridge followed the obiter in Didow, it offered no clue on what
a nuisance by transient intrusion would look like. The court in Kingsbridge
denied the plaintiff’s claim in trespass, saying the crane could only be a nuisance.
Nor did the court allow a nuisance claim because there was no harm to the
land.230 Similarly, transient intrusions by drones seem unlikely to harm the land.
The advantage of a nuisance claim is that it protects interests other than
possessory interest, for example, comfort and inconvenience. If the nature of the
surface owner’s rights in airspace are something less than possessory, this would
exclude a trespass claim. Given that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion
addresses more directly the privacy interests which have been protected by some
courts in nuisance cases, it seems more practical to make a claim based on that
224 Linden, supra note 212 at 581; See e.g. Saelman v. Hill, 2004 CarswellOnt 2089, [2004]
O.J. No. 2122 (Ont. S.C.J.).
225 Linden, supra note 212 at 59, 60; See e.g. Lipiec v. Borsa, 1996 CarswellOnt 4122, [1996]
O.J. No. 3819 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Tsige, supra note 63 at paras. 29-32.
226 Mainland Sawmills Ltd. v. IWA-Canada, Local 1-3567 Society, 2006 BCSC 1195, 2006
CarswellBC 1989, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1814 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 13.
227 Linden, supra note 212 at 590.
228 Ibid at 590, 591.
229 St. Pierre v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation Communications), 1987 CarswellOnt
678, 1987 CarswellOnt 964, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 906, [1987] S.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.C.) at 916
[S.C.R.].
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tort than in nuisance. Traditional nuisance claims such as noise or harm to land
are unlikely to succeed because drones do not normally damage the land, and
tend not to be as loud as aircraft. As has been seen, nuisance will protect against
privacy invasion that constitutes harassment, which may be a useful tool to
protect against more extreme privacy violations by drone.
(b) Privacy Law
This section of the paper will review the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and
the federal private sector privacy law.231 The property law defences against drone
invasion of privacy are only useful where the drone has entered airspace in which
the surface owner has some rights. Addressing privacy invasions by drones flying
over public streets, or at altitudes where they cannot be seen, requires considering
privacy law itself.
This paper will not cover the constitutional right to privacy.232 The Charter
right to privacy generally only comes into play where there is state action, which
most commonly happens in the criminal law context.233 This paper is concerned
with private use of drones and Charter rights cannot be invoked in disputes
between private parties.234 The Supreme Court of Canada has said that Charter
values should influence the development of the common law, but the Charter
should not be the basis for creating new torts.235 Nevertheless, Charter
jurisprudence on the right to privacy has influenced courts and academics in
their understanding of privacy law.236
(i) Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion emerged in the Ontario
case Tsige in 2012.237 Before the emergence of the common law tort, other
provinces already had statutory torts with the earliest in British Columbia dating
to 1968.238 The provincial statutory torts are similar.239 In outlining the common
law tort, the Ontario Court of Appeal borrowed from these statutes as well as
American tort law.240 This paper will focus on the British Columbia statute, since
231 PIPEDA, supra note 24.
232 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7-8, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to theCanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11; Linden, supra note 212 at 63.
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234 Charter, supra note 232 s. 32; Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 580, 1986
CarswellBC 411, 1986 CarswellBC 764, (sub nom. R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.)
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, [1986] S.C.J. No. 75 (S.C.C.) at 597 [S.C.R.].
235 Ibid at 603; McNairn, supra note 61 at 39.
236 See e.g. Tsige, supra note 63 at paras. 40-41; Hunt, supra note 126 at 686-689.
237 Tisge, supra note 63.
238 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373; McNairn, supra note 61 at 68.
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the jurisprudence there is most developed,241 and the Ontario tort because it is
unique as a common law tort in Canada.
Intrusion upon seclusion does not require harm.242 The violation must be
intentional and without lawful justification.243 A lawful justification includes an
insurer’s surveillance as part of a fraud investigation.244 In Tsige, the defendant
was a bank employee who viewed the plaintiff’s bank records 174 times over a
period of four years.245 Tsige’s reason for viewing the bank records was not bank
business but her own financial dispute with the plaintiff’s ex-husband.246 The
court held that this was not a lawful justification.247 Other types of claims
allowed by the British Columbia courts include peep holes and two-way mirrors
in a bedroom248 as well as surreptitious video recording in a bathroom.249 In
some of these cases the plaintiffs suffered harm.250 Even without harm punitive
damages have been awarded.251
The British Columbia and Ontario torts differ in two ways. First, British
Columbia’s Privacy Act refers to a violation of privacy, whereas Tsige refers to
invading the private affairs of another.252 Second, the Privacy Act protects
privacy that is ‘‘reasonable in the circumstances,”253 whereas the Ontario tort
protects against a violation that a reasonable person would consider ‘‘highly
offensive.”254
The court in Tsige noted that the statutory torts in Canada did not define
privacy, but simply ‘‘proclaimed a sweeping right to privacy”, leaving it to the
courts to fill in the details.255 In Davis, the British Columbia Supreme Court
interpreted privacy variously as ‘‘the right to be let alone”, ‘‘the right to an
241 McNairn, supra note 61 at 68.
242 Privacy Act, supra note 238 s. 1(1); Tsige, supra note 63 at paras. 74, 90.
243 Privacy Act, supra note 238 s. 1(1); Tsige, supra note 63 at para. 71.
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(B.C. S.C.).
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246 Ibid at para. 5.
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248 Lee v. Jacobson, 1992CarswellBC1119, [1992]B.C.J.No. 132 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 39, 46,
48 [Lee], reversed on other grounds 1994 CarswellBC 515, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2459 (B.C.
C.A.).
249 Malcolm v. Fleming, 2000 CarswellBC 1316, [2000] B.C.J. No. 2400 (B.C. S.C.) at paras.
4, 7 [Malcolm].
250 Lee, supra note 248 at paras. 46, 47;Malcolm, supra note 249 at paras. 7, 23.
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‘inviolate personality’”, and as the right to be ‘‘withdrawn from the society of
others, or from public interest.”256 These definitions are similar to Warren &
Brandeis.257 Tsige also relies on Warren & Brandeis.258 As seen earlier, inviolate
personality is also associated with the human dignity view of privacy. Hunt is
critical of Tsige for limiting the definition to a right that protects only ‘‘private
affairs.” Hunt argues that the concept of private affairs incorrectly assumes that
private and public affairs can be neatly separated.259 Though the British
Columbia and Ontario courts draw their definitions from the same source, the
results have been somewhat different.
The privacy interests protected in the Privacy Act and the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion are qualified differently. Tsige requires that the violation be
something that a reasonable person would consider highly offensive.260 The
court suggested that this includes intrusions into matters such as ‘‘...one’s
financial or health records, sexual practises and orientation, employment, diary
or private correspondence...”261 Hunt is critical of Tsige for using the ‘‘highly
offensive” qualifier because it ignores that harm to dignity is inherent in all
privacy violations. Otherwise reasonable claims, where dignity is harmed, may be
excluded by the ‘‘highly offensive” qualifier.262 Hunt argues that the reasonable
expectation of privacy (REP) as interpreted in the UK is a preferable method of
qualifying the protected interest.263 The REP test requires both identifying the
privacy interest and assessing whether it is reasonable in the circumstances.264
The UK’s REP test is essentially the same as the REP jurisprudence of the
Canadian courts in the criminal law context.265 Unlike Tsige, the British
Columbia Privacy Act qualifies the protected interest as that which is
‘‘reasonable in the circumstances”.266 The previously mentioned examples of
claims that were allowed under the Privacy Act are less egregious than the
hypothetical examples listed in Tsige. This suggests a broader application for the
Privacy Act than the Ontario tort, and seems to respond to Hunt’s criticism of
Tsige.
An example of how the REP approach protects a broader privacy interest is
found in the UK case Murray.267 The plaintiff was the infant son of J. K.
256 Davis v. McArthur, 1969 CarswellBC 230, [1969] B.C.J. No. 249 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 15-
16, reversed on other grounds 1970 CarswellBC 77, [1970] B.C.J. No. 664 (B.C. C.A.).
257 Warren, supra note 63 at 195, 205, 207.
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259 Hunt, supra note 126 at 682.
260 Tsige, supra note 63 at para. 71.
261 Ibid at para. 72.
262 Hunt, supra note 126 at 689-690, 694.
263 Ibid at 691, 694.
264 Ibid at 692.
265 Ibid at 689.
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Rowling. The defendant took photos of the family who were walking on the
street and subsequently published the photos in the Sunday Express.268 The court
held that ‘‘...the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
broad one, which takes into account all of the circumstances of the case.”269
While Murray was photographed in public, the photo was not merely an
inoffensive photo of the street, but a photo taken in secret and in the knowledge
that Murray’s parents would have objected.270 This is an example of a situation
where privacy in public should be protected by the law, as described in detail
earlier, and is relevant for potential invasions of privacy by drones.
The British Columbia cases described earlier are all examples of privacy
invasions that happened in private places. There are some British Columbia cases
which lean in the direction of Murray. In Heckert, the landlord positioned a
video camera in a hallway in a residential building so that it was focused on the
plaintiff’s door.271 The court found that the plaintiff had a REP when entering
and exiting her apartment, even though the hallway was a ‘‘public place” and
even though the landlord has a right to protect its property.272 Fillion was a case
of a family dispute.273 While the plaintiffs were away, the defendant entered the
family house, with authorization, to remove some personal belongings.274 While
there, she read and copied some personal documents that were left on a desk.275
Despite the fact that the defendant had the right to be in the house, and despite
the fact that the documents were in the open, the court found that the defendant
had violated the plaintiff’s privacy and awarded modest damages.276 Other
British Columbia cases have found that where multiple parties have access to the
same computer, there may be an invasion of privacy where one person reads the
files or emails of another.277
In the first 30 years after the Privacy Act was adopted in British Columbia,
few claims were made and few succeeded.278 The pace has picked up in recent
267 Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (U.K.) [Murray].
268 Ibid at para. 1.
269 Ibid at para. 36.
270 Ibid at para. 50.
271 Heckert v. 5470 Investments Ltd., 2008 BCSC 1298, 2008CarswellBC 2053, [2008] B.C.J.
No. 1854 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 9, 13
272 Ibid at paras. 86, 90.
273 Fillion v. Fillion, 2011 BCSC 1593, 2011 CarswellBC 3414, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2230 (B.C.
S.C.).
274 Ibid at paras. 79, 81-82, 85-86.
275 Ibid at paras. 81, 87, 89.
276 Ibid at paras. 160, 162, 199.
277 See e.g.Pacific Northwest Herb Corp. v. Thompson, 1999 CarswellBC 2738, [1999] B.C.J.
No. 2772 (B.C. S.C.);Nesbitt v. Neufeld, 2010 BCSC 1605, 2010CarswellBC 3085, [2010]
B.C.J. No. 2232 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 2011 CarswellBC 3403 (B.C. C.A.).
278 McNairn, supra note 61 at 73.
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years and the decision in Tsige has triggered renewed interest in the tort. The
British Columbia cases show that some courts are willing to entertain the
possibility of privacy rights in places that are not purely private, thus accepting a
less stark division between private and public. However, there are no British
Columbia cases quite like Murray. This probably reflects the relative maturity of
the UK tort and also the influence of the European Court of Human Rights on
British privacy jurisprudence.279 The breadth of the definition of privacy in
British Columbia, and the scope for interpretation left to the courts means that
the courts could move in either a direction that narrows the protected interest, or
one that broadens it. Tsige represents incremental change in the common law and
its development has not yet addressed the weaknesses pointed out by Hunt.280 It
is noteworthy that in Tsige, the court held that an intrusion includes physical
intrusion, as well as ‘‘...listening or looking, with or without mechanical aids.”281
This is important for any intrusion claims related to drones. To fully protect
against privacy invasions by drones, the common law in Ontario will need to
move in the direction of British Columbia and the UK by recognizing a privacy
rights in public.
(ii) Federal Private Sector Privacy Law
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information
in the private sector.282 PIPEDA is an act of Parliament and applies to federally-
regulated undertakings and in most provinces also applies to provincially-
regulated undertakings.283 PIPEDA will not apply to provincially-regulated
undertakings in provinces that have enacted legislation that is substantially
279 See Hunt, supra note 126 at 683, 686, 695;Murray, supra note 267 at paras, 20, 23.
280 See generally Tsige, supra note 63 at paras. 10, 15, 24-32, 35-38, 65. Notable cases that
have built on Tsige include: Hopkins v. Kay, 2014 ONSC 321, 2014 CarswellOnt 1215,
119 O.R. (3d) 251, [2014] O.J. No. 485 (Ont. S.C.J.), affirmed 2015 ONCA 112, 2015
CarswellOnt 2232, 124 O.R. (3d) 481, [2015] O.J. No. 751 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused 2015 CarswellOnt 16503, 2015CarswellOnt 16504 (S.C.C.), which addressed the
application of the tort to health records, as well as class-action certification and whether
the tort was precluded by Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O.
2004, c. 3, Sch. A. Evans v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2014 ONSC 2135, 2014 CarswellOnt
7666, [2014] O.J. No. 2708 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused 2014CarswellOnt 17769
(Ont. S.C.J.), on facts similar to Tsige, in which the plaintiff argued that the defendant
bank should be vicariously liable for intrusion by its employee. These cases were not
decided on themerits as theywere eithermotions for summary judgement ormotions for
class certification. Similar cases in other jurisdictions are Hynes v. Western Regional
Integrated Health Authority, 2014 NLTD(G) 137, 2014 CarswellNfld 343, 357 Nfld.
P.E.I.R. 138, [2014] N.J. No. 336 (N.L. T.D.) and Condon v. R., 2014 FC 250, 2014
CarswellNat 1256, 2014 CarswellNat 725, [2014] F.C.J. No. 297 (F.C.), reversed 2015
CarswellNat 2432 (F.C.A.).
281 Tsige, supra note 63 at para. 20.
282 McNairn, supra note 61 at 89; Power, supra note 68 at paras. 1.5-1.6.
283 PIPEDA, supra note 24 ss. 2(1), 4(1); Power, supra note 68 at para. 1.21.
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similar to PIPEDA.284 Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec have all enacted
substantially similar legislation.285
The constitutionality of PIPEDA’s application to provincially-regulated
undertakings has been questioned but remains unresolved.286 This paper takes
the position that since aviation is federally-regulated and Transport Canada is
taking the lead on drone regulation, PIPEDA and not provincial legislation, will
apply to drones.287 Therefore this paper’s focus is PIPEDA.
PIPEDA does not protect privacy directly, but indirectly, through the
protection of personal information.288 Personal information is defined as
‘‘information about an identifiable individual.”289 The information itself need
not precisely identify an individual; it is enough that a particular individual could
be identified by combining the personal information with other information.290
In a case decided on the federal public sector privacy legislation, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the definition of personal information (which is
similar to the definition in PIPEDA) is deliberately broad and intended to
capture any information about a specific person.291 Examples of personal
information include check-in and check-out times at a hotel,292 the device
identifier for a mobile phone,293 and in some cases an IP address.294
Collection, use and disclosure of personal information require the knowledge
and consent of the individual.295 This requires informing the individual of the
purpose for collection, use or disclosure.296 Use and disclosure of the
284 SeePIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 26(2)(b); McNairn, supra note 61 at 93; Power, supra note
68 at paras. 1.20, 1.24.
285 PIPEDA, supra note 24, Organizations in the Province of Alberta Exemption Order,
S.O.R./2004-219; Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Exemption Order,
S.O.R./2004-220; Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order, S.O.R./
2003-374.
286 See generally Josh Nisker, ‘‘PIPEDA: A Constitutional Analysis” (2006) 85 Can. Bar
Rev. 317.
287 Power, supra note 68 at para. 1.25.
288 Ibid at paras. 1.4, 2.1.
289 PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 2(1).
290 McNairn, supra note 61 at 109.
291 Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 1997 CarswellNat 870, 1997 CarswellNat 869,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, [1997] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.) at para. 69. See Privacy Act, supra note
238 s. 3.
292 PIPEDAReport of FindingsNo2013-007 (7August 2013), online: PrivacyCommissioner
of Canada <www.priv.gc.ca>.
293 PIPEDAReport of Findings No 2013-001 (15 January 2013), at para. 18, online: Privacy
Commissioner of Canada <www.priv.gc.ca>.
294 PIPEDA Case Summary No 2005-319 (8 November 2005), online: Privacy Commis-
sioner of Canada <www.priv.gc.ca>.
295 Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q830-96, s. 4.3.2,
being Schedule 1 of PIPEDA [Model Code].
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information collected is limited to the declared purpose.297 Use or disclosure for
other purposes requires further informed consent.298 Consent can be implied, but
only in a narrow set of circumstances.299 For example, subscribing to a magazine
implies consent to the collection of name and address information.300 However,
if the magazine publisher decided to use the information for another purpose, it
would require separate consent.
PIPEDA applies only to commercial activities.301 This includes commercial
activities carried out by non-profit organizations.302 As a result, some drone
operations that are regulated by Special Flight Operations Certificates (SFOC)
will not be regulated by PIPEDA, and vice-versa. For example, non-commercial
use of drones with a maximum take-off weight greater than 25kg,303 are
regulated by the SFOC process, but not PIPEDA. The result is that protection
from intrusions by these drones will be regulated only by the property and
privacy torts discussed earlier. PIPEDA also does not apply to journalistic or
artistic activities.304 This is an important exception since it is likely journalists
will find good uses for drones.
Commercial activity is defined broadly.305 It is ‘‘...any particular transaction,
act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial
character...”306 To be classed as commercial activity, the predominant purpose
must be making a profit. A single transaction that has the predominant purpose
of making a profit may be considered commercial activity.307 Commercial
activity and ‘‘commercial relationship” are different, and the absence of a
commercial relationship between the individual and the organization collecting
the information does not itself preclude the activity from being deemed
commercial. In Rousseau, the court considered whether note-taking by a
doctor, on behalf of an insurer as part of an independent medical examination,
was commercial activity.308 The insurer had a commercial relationship with both
the insured and the doctor, but there was no such relationship between the
296 Ibid s. 4.2; McNairn, supra note 61 at 113.
297 Model Code, supra note 295 s. 4.3.
298 McNairn, supra note 61 at 118.
299 Ibid, at 119.
300 Ibid.
301 PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 4; McNairn, supra note 61 at 89.
302 PIPEDA, supra note 24 ss. 2(1), 4(1)(a); McNairn, supra note 61 at 105.
303 The original terms of reference for the PDWG stated the MTOW boundary would be
35kg but the PDWGhas settled on a lower limit of 25kg. SeeTCCA, supranote 6 at 3 and
Phase 1, supra note 9 at 2.
304 PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 4(2)(c).
305 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Access to Information & Privacy, 2011 Reissue (Markham:
LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2011) at para. 85 [HAP]; McNairn, supra note 61 at 104-105.
306 PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 2(1).
307 HAP, supra note 305.
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insured and the doctor. The court held that the overall transaction did not lose its
commercial nature because of the introduction of a third party to the
relationship, in part because the insured was required by his insurance
contract to submit to the medical examination.309
Even an officer of the court may be engaged in commercial activity. In
PIPEDA Case 336, the Privacy Commissioner considered whether a bankruptcy
trustee appointed by the court was engaging in commercial activity.310 The
Commissioner found that being an officer of the court did not remove trustees
from the jurisdiction of PIPEDA and noted that trustees are remunerated for
their work.311 An investigation by an insurer to defend against a tort claim was
held not to be conduct of a commercial character, because the predominant
purpose was not to make a profit, even though the insurer was a for-profit
business.312 These cases, in particular Rousseau, show that the breadth of
‘‘commercial activity” ensures that the technicalities of the parties’ relationships
do not preclude the application of PIPEDA.
The difficult part in applying PIPEDA to drones is with knowledge and
consent. There are two reasons for this. First, there are practical challenges with
informing individuals of the collection of personal information by drone and
obtaining consent. Second, this implicates the problem of privacy in public,
because some argue that information about activities done in public is ‘‘publicly
available information” and therefore qualifies for one of the PIPEDA
exemptions.313 The Privacy Commissioner has provided some clues on how the
knowledge and consent requirements might apply to drones.
The Commissioner’s fact sheet on commercial use of imaging technology in
public states that PIPEDA applies if the images are of identifiable people.314
Because individuals do not always know their image is being captured, the
Privacy Commissioner believes that before pictures are taken, the public should
be informed of the time and place of the recording, why it’s happening and how
to have their image deleted. The Privacy Commissioner suggests that having
obvious markings on a vehicle, such as Google’s Street View cars, would help in
this regard.315 The fact sheet does not directly address how to obtain consent and
308 Rousseau v. Wyndowe, 2008 FCA 39, 2008 CarswellNat 246, 2008 CarswellNat 1530,
[2008] F.C.J. No. 151 (F.C.A.) at paras. 1, 35.
309 Ibid at paras. 35-36, 39.
310 PIPEDA Case Summary 2006-336 (21 June 2006), online: Privacy Commissioner of
Canada <www.priv.gc.ca>.
311 Ibid.
312 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Canada (Privacy Commissioner), 2010
FC 736, 2010 CarswellNat 3689, 2010 CarswellNat 2225, [2010] F.C.J. No. 889 (F.C.) at
paras. 98, 105-106 [State Farm]. See also McNairn, supra note 61 at 114.
313 See PIPEDA, supra note 24 s. 7.
314 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Captured on Camera: Street-level
imaging technology, the Internet and you, at 1, online: <www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC,
‘‘Captured”].
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therefore it seems that notice is sufficient to satisfy PIPEDA. This interpretation
is consistent with the the practice of posting a notice where video surveillance is
used in public places without obtaining explicit consent from individuals
frequenting those public places, which appears to satisfy PIPEDA.
In the Street View investigation, the Privacy Commissioner considered
Google’s collection of payload data from unsecured wireless access points.
Google’s Street View cars record images for its Street View service and also
wireless network information for use in location services.316 The Commissioner
found that the payload information was beyond what was necessary for the
declared purposes and that even though the wireless networks were unsecured,
no reasonable person would have considered collecting the payload information
to be appropriate.317 Since individuals did not know their information was being
collected from the wireless networks, they could not have consented and
therefore Google had violated PIPEDA.318 It is clear that notifying individuals
of plans to take photos is not enough to then slurp up payload data from wireless
networks. It is significant that the lack of security on the wireless access points
was not relevant to the decision, since it is generally considered unwise to leave
wireless networks unsecured. Also significant for cutting edge technology like
drones is that the Commissioner insisted that Google, which likes to push the
limits in its goal of ‘‘organizing the world’s information”, owes a special
responsibility to those whose personal information it collects.319
Drones will fly within visual range of those being observed but also at high
altitudes well beyond an individual’s sight. While drones flown within sight of the
observed may be analogous to Street View cars, high-altitude drones are different
and present unique challenges for PIPEDA. High-altitude drones are analogous
to covert video surveillance because they operate without any notice to the
individuals whose personal information is being captured.320 The Commissioner
has said that covert video surveillance should only be used in the most limited
cases. This is because consent, which is the foundation of PIPEDA, is not
obtained from the individual who is subject to covert surveillance.321 In order to
conduct covert video surveillance an organization must be reasonably satisfied
that collection with knowledge and consent would compromise the availability or
accuracy of the information and the covert collection must be a reasonable
315 Ibid at 2.
316 PIPEDA Case Summary 2011-001 (20 May 2011), online: Privacy Commissioner of
Canada <www.priv.gc.ca> at paras. 6, 7 [Street View]. Examples of data collected by
Google are listed at paras. 17-18.
317 Ibid at paras. 13, 20-21.
318 Ibid at paras. 38-39, 47.
319 Ibid at paras. 10, 26.
320 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidance on Covert Video
Surveillance in the Private Sector (Ottawa: Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2009)
online: <www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC, ‘‘Covert”].
321 Ibid.
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measure to investigate a breach of the law or a contract.322 In addition, there
must be a demonstrable need for covert collection, the information collected
must achieve the declared purpose of the covert collection, and the loss of privacy
must be proportional to the benefit gained.323 Given PIPEDA’s emphasis on
consent, it is surprising that even this limited use of covert video surveillance is
permissible. If high-altitude drones are analogous to covert video surveillance,
then they will not be able to collect personal information unless they meet the
requirements described above. It seems there are few circumstances in which
drones would meet these requirements. Yet, Transport Canada is pressing ahead
to develop regulations to integrate all drones into Canadian airspace. Routine
use of high-altitude drones, which collect personal information as a matter of
course, does not appear to be consistent with PIPEDA.
In the fact sheet on commercial use of imaging technologies, the Privacy
Commissioner notes that PIPEDA applies to these activities, even if done in
public.324 PIPEDA then applies to the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information found in public places. PIPEDA provides exemptions for personal
information that is publicly available, for example, telephone directory
information, records of judicial bodies, and published information.325 However
these exemptions only apply where the collection, use or disclosure of the
information related to the purpose of the public registry in which the information
is found and also that it be a purpose that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate.326 In 2012 the Alberta Court of Appeal considered the application
of the publicly available information exception in that province’s privacy
legislation, in the context of a labour dispute.327 In that case, the union and the
employer had taken video recordings of individuals crossing the picket line in a
public place.328 The court held that the publicly available information exception
was narrow and notwithstanding that the information was captured in public, it
did not qualify as publicly available information.329 It is clear then that simply
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
324 OPC, ‘‘Captured”, supra note 314 at 1.
325 PIPEDA, supra note 24, Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, S.O.R./
2001-7, s. 1.
326 Ibid. See also Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal Information”
(2013) 11:1 C.J.L.T. 1 at 9.
327 UFCW,Local 401 v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2012ABCA 130,
2012 CarswellAlta 760, (sub nom. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v.
Alberta (Privacy Commissioner)) 522 A.R. 197, [2012] A.J. No. 427 (Alta. C.A.),
additional reasons 2012 CarswellAlta 1393 (Alta. C.A.), affirmed 2013 CarswellAlta
2210, 2013 CarswellAlta 2211 (S.C.C.) [UFCW].
328 Ibid at paras. 2, 3.
329 Ibid at paras. 10, 27, 85, UFCW, Local 401 v. Alberta (Information and Privacy
Commissioner), 2013 SCC 62, 2013 CarswellAlta 2210, 2013 CarswellAlta 2211, (sub
nom. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial
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being in public does not deprive an individual of the right to control her personal
information.
The definition of personal information in PIPEDA is broad as is the
definition of commercial activity. These definition make for broad application of
PIPEDA. Parliament has made a deliberate policy choice to exclude non-
commercial activities and this affects other sectors as much as it affects the use of
drones. PIPEDA’s strength is its application to information gleaned from
individuals’ activities in public, but this is also its weakness. The Privacy
Commissioner’s fact sheet on commercial use of imaging technologies in public
does not directly address consent. It implies that notice with an opportunity to
have one’s personal information deleted is sufficient for PIPEDA. As the
proliferation of video surveillance in public places shows, this interpretation of
knowledge and consent allows for substantial and pervasive surveillance,
something not intuitively consistent with protecting privacy. Covertly
capturing images in public is also not consistent with protecting privacy, as the
Commissioner’s guidelines illustrate.
The discussion so far has focused on imaging technology, except for the
Street View investigation which addressed collection of personal information
from wireless networks. While imaging technology is often the focus of attention,
it is only one of many ways to collect personal information. Other means of
collecting personal information, using some of sensors described earlier in the
paper, are analogous to imaging technology. These sensors will be subject to
PIPEDA, whether they are deployed openly in public or covertly using high-
altitude drones. Because Transport Canada is not considering privacy as it
develops drone regulations, it is not clear how PIPEDA will apply in practice. As
mentioned already, the proliferation of video surveillance in public, while
compliant with PIPEDA, leaves something to be desired. As drones become
more common, and in particular as high-altitude drones are integrated into
Canadian airspace, it seems likely that the notion of consent underlying PIPEDA
will be further eroded, thus undermining privacy protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drones present significant challenges for existing legal doctrines. The privacy
threats of drones are perhaps not new. Rather, there are similar concerns with
existing technologies and drones, as Calo has said, accentuate the risks.
Property law as a tool to protect privacy depends on the extent and nature of
the surface owner’s rights in airspace. These questions have been addressed to the
extent necessary to allow aircraft to fly through what used to be considered
airspace owned by the surface owner. However, since aircraft do not normally fly
Workers, Local 401) [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62 (S.C.C.) at paras. 16, 26,
27. Having found the publicly available personal information exception did not apply in
the circumstances, the courts then consideredwhether the legislation itself was consistent
with the freedom of expression protections guaranteed in s. 2(b) of the Charter.
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at low altitudes, except near airports, the Canadian courts have not addressed
specifically the rights the surface owner has in the airspace above his land. If the
right is possessory, then the surface owner may be able to claim trespass against
drones that intrude into his airspace. If the right is something less than
possessory, then nuisance may provide a remedy, though its higher threshold for
harm would make this difficult.
PIPEDA is comprehensive commercial privacy legislation. Two weaknesses
limit the usefulness of PIPEDA in protecting against privacy interference by
drone. The first is that PIPEDA only applies to commercial drone operations,
leaving some drone operators free of its privacy regulation. The second weakness
is PIPEDA’s heavy reliance on the utopic idea of consent. The erosion of consent
requirements around the use of video surveillance and Street View are two
examples that illustrate the problem. Given the economic value Transport
Canada sees in drones, and the historical example of how property rights
changed to accommodate air travel, it seems likely that consent and PIPEDA’s
effectiveness will be further diminished.
The privacy torts, both statutory and common law, may be the strongest
existing defences against privacy intrusions by drone. A tort claim is available
regardless of whether the drone operation is a commercial activity. There are two
weaknesses here as well. As Hunt has pointed out, one problem is the courts’
view of privacy and how the right to privacy should be qualified. There have been
positive developments in the UK, though it is not clear similar judicial thinking
will be adopted in Canada. The view held by the UK courts may be influenced by
European privacy law, which is not necessarily persuasive in Canadian courts.
The second weakness is a practical one: as legal practitioners know, litigation is
expensive, putting the tort remedy out of reach for many.
In the article that precipitated the development of privacy law in the United
States, and consequently Canada, Warren & Brandeis were concerned about a
problem similar to that of drones. They were faced with the invention of
instantaneous photographs and worried about the impact this would have on the
privacy to which they were accustomed. It seems likely that Warren & Brandeis
would be no more amused to have a private wedding ceremony intruded upon by
a drone, than they were by the paparazzi of their time taking instantaneous
photographs.
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